James Madison University

JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository

Center for International Stabilization and
Recovery

3-2006

Building Local Mine Action Capacity in Guinea-Bissau
Tracy Brown
Handicap International - France

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, Public
Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Brown, Tracy, "Building Local Mine Action Capacity in Guinea-Bissau" (2006). Global CWD Repository.
1062.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/1062

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at
JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized
administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.

Building Local Mine Action Capacity in Guinea-Bissau – Project Evaluation Report (March 2006)

Project Evaluation Report
March 2006
Bissau sans mines ni UXOs – Projet de renforcement des
capacites locales d’action contre les mines
et les UXOs en Guinee Bissau
(Building Local Mine Action Capacity in Guinea-Bissau)
A project of Handicap International – France
in partnership with the Bissau-Guinean NGO, HUMAID
January 1, 2005 to March 31, 2006
Total Budget: €738,057
EuropeAid - European Commission: €600,000
(MAP/2004/095-744)
Handicap International – France: €138,057

Prepared by Tracy Brown
Independent Consultant contracted by Handicap International – France
tracycb@sympatico.ca

1

Building Local Mine Action Capacity in Guinea-Bissau – Project Evaluation Report (March 2006)

1.

INTRODUCTION / BACKGROUND

The HI – HUMAID Project
With prior programming experience in Guinea-Bissau and significant Mine Action
experience internationally, Handicap International – France (HI) was awarded €600,000
through EuropeAid’s Appeal 117489 / C / G / Multi (2003/04) toward a 15-month
partnership project with the Bissau-Guinean NGO, Humanitarian Aid (HUMAID), entitled:
Bissau sans mines ni UXOs – Projet de renforcement des capacites locales d’action
contre les mines et les UXOs en Guinee Bissau, hereinafter referred to in English as
Building Local Mine Action Capacity in Guinea-Bissau.1 The EC contribution
represented 81% of the total budget of €738,057.
The general objectives of the project, covering the period January 1, 2005 to March 31,
2006, were 1) to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Mine Action in GuineaBissau and in so doing, 2) to reduce the threat of landmines and UXOs in the urban and
peri-urban areas of Bissau, the capital of Guinea-Bissau (where 30% of the country’s
population of approximately 1.6 million reside).
Specifically the project sought to strengthen local capacity for Mine Action in accordance
with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) through budget support, technical
assistance and accompaniment to HUMAID. The project was to benefit HUMAID’s 77
staff members (deminers, other field staff, administrative and management personnel),
and indirectly, the population of Bissau whose livelihoods would improve as a result of
the reduced threat from landmines and UXO. In the end, direct beneficiaries also
included deminers of LUTCAM, the one other mine clearance NGO in Guinea Bissau
whose deminers participated in HI-facilitated technical training, and the staff of the
national Mine Action coordinating body, CAAMI, who benefited from on-the-ground
technical expertise provided by HI advisors.

The Landmine / UXO problem in Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau’s landmine and UXO contamination can be traced to three conflicts:
 the war of Independence from Portugal (1963 to1974), when landmines were used
to defend Portuguese military installations, and were also laid around the military
headquarters of the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and
Cape Verde), and along the border with Guinea Conakry;
 the 1998/99 civil war affecting primarily the capital Bissau and surrounding areas,
where the frontline extended 11 km through residential areas, cashew orchards and
industrial infrastructure. Government forces comprised of mostly Senegalese and
Guinea Conakry military reinforcements laid mines in a defensive measure against
the Bissau-Guinean Junta which controlled the airport and access to the interior of
the country. An estimated 190,000 people, or 54% of the population of Bissau, were
said to be directly affected by this mine threat2. Moreover, the frontline
neighborhoods of Bissau were densely littered with thousands of UXOs, due in large
1

The original project title was in French and a number of slightly different English and Portuguese
translations have been used in project documents.
2
Estimate of affected population taken from HUMAID’s fundraising appeal letter written by John Blacken
(September 2005).
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part to the explosion of a suburban armory during the war. As well, four areas in the
south of the country are also known to have been mined during this conflict;
and thirdly, the on-going low-level conflict in Senegal’s Casamance region between
the Government of Senegal and the Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de
la.Casamance (MFDC) affecting the northern border zone of Guinea-Bissau.

From 2003 to mid 2004, 41 people were killed or injured by mines and UXOs in GuineaBissau bringing the total number of registered victims from 1963 to mid 2004 to 6653. Of
note is the fact that registered victims can be found in all regions of the country, with
35% in the north, 21% in the east, 19% in the south and 25% in Bissau town4.
Approximately 25% of all victims, including the most recent victims, have been the result
of UXO incidents5, highlighting the particular need to include EOD in capacity-building
strategies and in clearance priorities.

HUMAID and Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau
HUMAID was founded in 2000 by a Canadian resident in Bissau, Elaine Grimson, and a
small group of war veterans to address the imminent threat posed by mines and UXOs
in the city of Bissau. Just days after HUMAID was created, Elaine Grimson died
unexpectedly and the remaining founders of HUMAID asked John Blacken, a former US
Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau, also resident in Bissau, to lead the organization. With
no initial funding, limited materials and equipment, and rudimentary techniques,
HUMAID began identifying and marking mine and UXO contamination in Bissau, and
clearing mines and UXO. Thus, was the start of Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau.
Guinea-Bissau signed the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997 and ratified it in 2001, providing a
legal impetus for Mine Action. And in 2001, the National Mine Action Coordination
Centre (CAAMI) was established under the authority of the inter-ministerial National
Commission for Humanitarian Demining (CNDH). The CAAMI is responsible for
implementing the National Mine Action Program (PAAMI) which serves as the
programmatic framework for Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau.
Since its inception, UNDP has provided budget support, technical assistance and inhouse expatriate advisors to the CAAMI.
In 2002, UNDP created LUTCAM as the operational arm of the CAAMI to carry out
clearance tasks, ostensibly with a vision towards eventual semi-independence as a
national NGO. It is not clear whether the decision by UNDP to create a new operational
structure was intended to increase the operational capacity beyond just HUMAID hoping
the necessary funding would materialize, or was a move to establish an alternative to
HUMAID, knowing full-well there would be limited resources in the medium term to
maintain two separate clearance organizations.
The coordination of clearance tasks was centralized in the CAAMI, though to-date no
formal accreditation process for operational partners has been established. And lacking
its own National Operating Standards, the CAAMI has referred to Mozambican and
Angolan interpretations of the IMAS as a guide for the application of international
standards in Guinea-Bissau.
3

Guinea-Bissau National Plan for Completion 2005-2009 (May 2005).
HUMAID”s fundraising appeal letter written by John Blacken (September 2005).
5
Guinea-Bissau National Plan for Completion 2005-2009 (May 2005).
4
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Until 2003, when LUTCAM began operations, HUMAID was the lone operator in
clearance activities in Guinea-Bissau. HUMAID had by then received donor support
from the UK, Sweden, France, Germany, the US, and UNDP totaling some $1.27 million
over four years. With this support HUMAID claims to have cleared 396,236 m2, and
removed 2,480 anti-personnel landmines, 53 anti-tank mines, 144 anti-boat mines,
13,719 large UXOs (> 12.77 mm) and 10,000 kg of spent bullets and other metals from
the ground by the end of 2003 (refer to ANNEX F (b) – HUMAID’s Cumulative Results
2000-2005)6.
By 2004, the combined clearance capacity of HUMAID and LUTCAM had reached some
100 manual deminers with total production averaging 10,000 m2 per month in Bissau7.
LUTCAM was funded and managed by UNDP through the CAAMI, and HUMAID was
operating as an independent NGO, with a 2004 annual budget of approximately
$500,000 funded entirely by the German Government through Caritas, a Catholic relief
organization.
In Bissau, 17 urban and peri-urban areas had been identified and marked by HUMAID
and LUTCAM with an approximate size of 6.5 million m2 - of which HUMAID claims to
have cleared 511,530 m2 by the end of 20048. Although 21 additional areas in the
interior of the country were known to be mined, including four areas linked to the
1998/99 conflict (though no impact or technical survey has to date been carried out to
confirm the extent of the contamination), both LUTCAM and HUMAID have worked
exclusively in Bissau. The CAAMI has made it clear that only after Bissau was
completed would clearance activities move out into the rest of the country. Moreover,
neither HUMAID nor LUTCAM have the logistical capacity to venture outside Bissau.
Until 2004, relations between the CAAMI and UNDP, on the one side, and HUMAID on
the other, were characterized by high levels of tension and as a result national
coordination was less effective9.

6

These figures are taken from HUMAID monthly reports to the CAAMI. Prior to 2003, HUMAID was
registering only UXOs larger than 12.77 mm in the UXO count and all other metals removed in the
category of Other Metals Removed (by kg). In 2003, The CAAMI instructed HUMAID to begin to count
spent bullets and other small metal fragments from UXOs in the UXO count. Note also that there are some
discrepancies in HUMAID’s production data from one document to another (as outlined in Annex E (b) –
HUMAID’s Cumulative Results 2000-2005, and no verified / official figures available from HI or the
CAAMI.
7
Figure taken from the Guinea-Bissau National Plan for the Completion Initiative 2005-2009, prepared by
UNDP-Guinea-Bissau (May 2005).
8
Estimate of the total contamination in Bissau town and total area cleared by HUMAID taken from
HUMAID documents.
9
HUMAID followed CAAMI directives begrudgingly, convinced they were being made to clear lowpriority areas with relatively minor landmine and UXO contamination in an effort to discredit the
organization vis-à-vis HUMAID’s donors and to build support for LUTCAM in an increasingly
competitive funding environment. Though institutional relations between the CAAMI and HUMAID are
considerably improved at present, due in part to HI’s efforts to promote more effective coordination, old
resentments and distrust linger.
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In 2004, the UNDP included Guinea-Bissau in its Completion Initiative – aimed at
mobilizing donor support towards “finishing the job” in those countries with relatively
small landmine / UXO contamination and where it should be possible - with targeted
donor support - to definitively take care of the problem. Guinea-Bissau later produced its
own National Plan for Completion (May 2005) dependent on the combined operational
capacity of HUMAID and LUTCAM (or some variation of the equivalent).
Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau takes place in the challenging context of extreme poverty
– with the country ranking as the 6th poorest in the world, massive debt, an economy
heavily dependent on foreign aid, a lack of natural resources and infrastructure, and a
high level of political instability. The overthrow of long-time President Joao “Nino” Vieira
in 1999 was followed by a succession of governments. And, in August 2005, Nino Vieira
was returned to power in a presidential election that promised to re-establish political
stability in the country. The sacking of a rival Prime Minister and subsequent political infighting over the final months of 2005 have once again raised concerns of on-going
instability. These factors, combined with low levels of state capacity and high levels of
corruption have driven those few donors potentially interested in Guinea-Bissau to a
stand-off position.

Project Justification
It was in this international and national context that HI envisioned an initiative to build
HUMAID’s capacity in mine / UXO clearance to international standards, while also
strengthening HUMAID’s organizational performance, in line with HI’s strategy to
develop national capacities in Mine Action.
By 2004 HUMAID had come a long way from the rag-tag group of go-getter veterans
who in 2000 began prodding for landmines and picking up rockets outside any known
safety standards or acceptable practice. The organization had secured over a million
US dollars to fund humanitarian clearance operations since 2000 without external
accompaniment, had benefited from short-term training and technical assistance from
Dutch, Australian and Mozambican trainers, and had acquired basic protective gear and
clearance equipment. HUMAID followed the directives and priorities established by the
CAAMI (however begrudgingly) and clearance operations were carried out without
incident. The organization had established itself as a credible and committed player in
Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau.
HUMAID had undeniably progressed but most agreed there was more to be done to
professionalize HUMAID’s clearance capacity as per IMAS10. HI was well-positioned to
provide the kinds of technical and organizational supports required. As such HUMAID
was the obvious, and arguably the most strategic choice of local partners for HI.
In granting HI 600,000 Euros for the project Building Local Mine Action Capacity in
Guinea-Bissau, the EC responded to the well documented need for continued clearance
operations in Guinea-Bissau towards Completion objectives, while at the same time
reinforcing and professionalizing an already existing local operator in-line with its 20022004 Mine Action Strategy and the not yet written 2005-2007 Mine Action Strategy – the
European Roadmap towards a Zero Victim Target.

10

Handicap International, CAAMI, and others all recognized that clearance practices prior to the HI
partnership project were not in line with IMAS. HUMAID field staff concurred with this assessment.
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The Partnership Agreement
HI worked with HUMAID in designing the project proposal for the EC and signed a
formal Partnership Agreement with HUMAID as the framework for collaboration. The
collaboration included budget support to HUMAID operations (salaries, equipment and
operational costs), technical support, training and accompaniment in demining and EOD,
and technical support, training and accompaniment in organizational / managerial areas
(administration, finance, and logistics).

HI’s Human Resource Inputs
HI recruited a team of 2 technical advisors/trainers to train and accompany HUMAID
intensively through the project – a demining / EOD specialist and an administrator /
management trainer / advisor. The HI staffing was enhanced through the later addition
of a third full-time technical advisor / trainer in community liaison (data collection /
mapping) and MRE - not funded within the EC project budget. While the project team of
3 HI advisors / trainers had other responsibilities related to managing HI’s office and
operations in Guinea-Bissau, they were otherwise engaged full-time in project activities.

Project Implementation
The project began in January 2005, and has proceeded as per the original proposal.
There have been delays in implementation but few programming changes and only
minor budget revisions not requiring formal amendments to the contract with the EC.
Nonetheless, all programmatic and budgetary revisions have been documented in
communications with the EC and in the project Interim Narrative Report submitted to the
EC in October 2005.

The Project Evaluation
An external final evaluation was planned and budgeted. HI has coordinated this
evaluation in concert with the EC Delegation in Guinea-Bissau. The Terms of Reference
for the evaluation are attached as ANNEX A, but can be summarized as:





To assess the degree to which the project objectives have been achieved, with
particular attention to capacity-building methodologies, efficiency, relevance and
sustainability;
To provide HI with recommendations for effective project closure; and
To provide HI with recommendations for future capacity-building projects.

This document represents the written synopsis of the evaluation. Subsequent sections
present the Evaluation Methodology, an Overview of Project Commitments and Outputs
To-Date, a Discussion of Findings & Lessons-Learned in Areas of Intervention, Other
Management Considerations, an Assessment of the Project’s Relevance, an
Assessment of Efficiency & Effectiveness, an Assessment of Sustainability & Impact,
Conclusions & Lessons-Learned, and Recommendations. Attached to body of the report
are six documents including detailed accounts of the Evaluation activities, individuals
and documents consulted, HUMAID’s production data, and a combined Self-Assessment
and External Assessment of HUMAID’s Organizational Performance.
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2.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The approach to this evaluative exercise was a mix of technocratic assessments of
project outputs and more interpretative assessments of project processes toward
desired outcomes. An effort was made to assess both the micro-workings of project
implementation as well as the macro policy and partnership context in which the project
was envisioned and played out. Documents were reviewed, interviews were conducted
with key individuals one-on-one and in small groups, and training sessions, daily
activities and partner interactions were observed over the course of 11 days in-country in
February 2006. A detailed program of contacts and evaluation activities is attached as
ANNEX B, the list of individuals consulted as ANNEX C, and documents reviewed as
ANNEX D.
In evaluating organizational capacity-building aspects of the project, the Evaluator was
informed by a number of structured “organizational self-assessment” tools developed
and previously administered by HI with HUMAID as well as HI’s assessment of
HUMAID’s organizational performance11.
In evaluating HUMAID’s technical capacity in Mine Action as per IMAS, the Evaluator
referred to written tests used in the training courses conducted by HI’s Demining & EOD
Technical Advisor and the expert opinion of HI. Observations as to HUMAID’s technical
capacity were also received from the UNDP Chief Technical Advisor on Mine Action, and
the Director of the CAAMI.

Methodological Considerations



The evaluator is not a technical specialist in mine clearance and EOD, thus not
qualified to independently assess the technical capacity of HUMAID in these
activities (in a strictly technical sense), much less to evaluate the expertise /
capacity of HI’s technical assistance. Moreover, the evaluation was carried out
during a break in the mine / UXO clearance schedule of HUMAID and it was
impossible to observe clearance work first-hand.



It is expected that HI will provide its own evaluation of the technical capacity of
HUMAID in mine / UXO clearance in final reporting on the project. While a certain
degree of subjectivity and conflict of interest are inherent and unavoidable in this,
the expert technical assessment of HI should be deemed by all parties to be valid.



The evaluator originally proposed to bring all interlocutors in the project together in
an evaluation workshop, but HI advised that this methodology might not be the most
appropriate given existing dynamics between and among the key players. It is the
opinion of the evaluator (with the benefit of hindsight) that a broader forum of
stakeholders might or might not have been more productive, but for certain some
form of facilitated reflection involving HI and HUMAID would have been helpful in
working through partnership tensions towards more productive collaboration and

11

Managerial Assessment – Administrative, Human Resources, Financial, Logistics (December 2005),
compiled by Annabelle Djeribi, HI Administrator & Logistics Coordinator / Technical Advisor to
HUMAID.
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synergy through the final weeks of the project, and in sousing out project
achievements and lessons-learned.



The technical and methodological limitations noted, the evaluator believes the inputs
received were sufficient to address the primary objectives of the evaluation and the
most pressing concerns of HI and HUMAID at this juncture in the life of the project.

8
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3.

OVERVIEW OF PROJECT COMMITMENTS &
OUTPUTS TO-DATE
3.1 The Project Log Frame Revisited12

General Objectives
1. To reduce the risk of landmines and UXOs in the urban and peri-urban areas of Bissau.
2. To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau.

Specific Objective
Local Mine Action capacity is strengthened in Guinea-Bissau as per International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS).

Verifiable Indicators

Source and Means of
Verification

Assumptions

1. HUMAID receives technical and
administrative supports in the
management of Mine Action as per
IMAS and in coordination with
CAAMI.

HUMAID’s Organigram.

Political stability in the
country so as to permit
project implementation.

2. Within 2 years HUMAID has the
capacity to manage Mine Action
projects as per IMAS.

Test results from training courses.

HUMAID’s activity reports.
External evaluation.

CAAMI supports Mine
Action partners.

Expected Results

Verifiable Indicators

Source and
Means of
Verification

Assumptions

1. Local
competencies to direct
and manage mine
clearance activities
are developed (within
HUMAID).

Preconditions: HUMAID and HI sign a partnership agreement and the
security situation in the country is remains stable.
At least 3 HUMAID staff are
UNDP funds HUMAID’s
Activity reports.
trained in project
participation in
management.
Training reports.
international training for
mid and senior
At least 2 additional HUMAID External evaluation. managers of HUMAID.
staff are trained in
bookkeeping and financial
HUMAID’s SOPs.
CAAMI validates
management.
HUMAID’s SOPs.
New information
management tools are used
by HUMAID.
HUMAID develops Standing
Operating Procedures
(SOPs) and these are
submitted to the CAAMI.

12

An English translation of the original project log frame in French is presented here.
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Expected Results

Verifiable Indicators

Source and
Means of
Verification

Assumptions

2. More effective mine
/ UXO clearance in the
urban and peri-urban
areas of Bissau.

Independent adherence to
IMAS.

Activity reports.

CAAMI’s assessment of
HUMAID results and
impact corresponds to
that of HUMAID and the
reality on the ground.

3. Improved
coordination between
HUMAID and the
CAAMI.

53 HUMAID deminers are
trained.

Internal HUMAID
quality control
reports.

At least 10 HUMAID
deminers are trained in EOD.

CAAMI quality
control reports.

HUMAID submits regular and
satisfactory reports to the
CAAMI.

The CAAMI is
satisfied with
HUMAID’s activity
reports.

CAAMI sends other trainees
to participate in project
training sessions.
Space for collective analysis
of Mine Action in GuineaBissau.

HUMAID is accredited
by the CAAMI.

The CAAMI is
satisfied with
HUMAID’s quality
control reports.

Activities
Activities for Result #1 - Local
competencies to direct and manage
mine clearance activities are
developed (within HUMAID).
1.1 Recruit a Deputy Director for
HUMAID.
1.2 Training or HUMAID in project
management and fundraising.
1.3 Training or HUMAID in
bookkeeping and financial
management.
1.4 Establish administrative, financial
and human resource systems
within HUMAID.

Inputs

Assumptions

The Training Dept. of HI.

The existence of potential English
speaking candidates for the position
of Deputy Director of HUMAID.

Training mission from HI
Brussels.
1 monitoring mission by
HI’s Finance Dept.
1 HI Technical Advisor.

UNDP funds mid-senior
management training for Mine
Action.
Approval of HUMAID’s SOPs by the
CNDH and CAAMI.

1 HI Administrator / Trainer.

1.5 Develop HUMAID’s Standing
Operating Procedures (SOPs).
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Activities for Result # 2 –

Inputs

Assumptions

More effective mine / UXO
clearance in the urban and periurban areas of Bissau.
2.1 Training in IMAS.

1 HI Technical Advisor.

The GICHD carries out a training mission
on IMSMA in Guinea-Bissau.

2.2 Training sessions for
HUMAID on survey
techniques, data collection,
MRE, EOD, use of mine
detection dogs, and
mechanical demining.

EOD training materials.

2.3 Technical accompaniment
and supervision in the field.

Machine for clearing
brush.
Support mission by HI
Logistics Dept.

2.4 Create and operationalize 2
EOD teams.

EOD operational
materials.
Mine detection dog team.

1 pick-up vehicle.
2.5 Equip HUMAID with the
necessary vehicles and
materials for clearance
activities.
2.6 Train, equip and establish a
Community Liaison team to
facilitate clearance activities,
carry out MRE and collect
data on dangerous areas.

Clearance materials and
equipment.
Support from HI’s
PEPAM Dept.
10 EOD staff from
HUMAID.
5 Community Liaison staff
from HUMAID.

Activities for Result # 3 –
Improved coordination between
HUMAID and the CAAMI.
3.1 Improve the quantity and quality
of reports submitted by HUMAID
to the CAAMI in support of
national data collection and
coordination.
3.2 Facilitate HUMAID’s participation
in collective work on national
Mine Action Standards.

The CAAMI supports and monitors the
training being conducted.
ANDES participates in the training on
MRE along with the HI PEPAM Dept. and
assists in establishing the HUMAID
Community Liaison team.
There are no serious dog illnesses in
Guinea-Bissau.
The mechanical clearance machine is
funded by a European donor.
The CAAMI undertakes quality control of
all clearance activities.
Switzerland provides micro-charges for
EOD.
The Ministry of Transport facilitates the
entry of project materials into the country.
The Ministry of Defense authorizes the
storage of explosives for EOD.

Inputs

Assumptions

1 HI Technical
Advisor.

The HUMAID reports to the CAAMI are
found to be acceptable.

HUMAID staff.

The CAAMI organizes work sessions on
national Mine Action Standards.
The CAAMI and LUTCAM show interest in
the trainings organized by HI for HUMAID.
The CAAMI supports an impact study.

3.3 Include other Mine Action actors
in technical training by / through
the CAAMI.
3.4 Contribute to a Landmine Impact
study in close collaboration with
other Mine Action actors in
Guinea-Bissau.
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3.2

Activities & Outputs To-Date

Activities for Result #1 - Local competencies to direct and manage mine clearance activities
are developed within HUMAID.

Planned
Activity

Importance in
Achieving Desired
Result 1-5 13

Carried Out
YES / NO

(1 = not very, 5 =
very important)
1.1 Recruit a
Deputy Director for
HUMAID.

NO, but efforts made to encourage and assist HUMAID to restructure internally towards the same objective. Changes in
strategy were documented and communicated to the EC in the
interim narrative report (Sept/05) and other correspondence.

1.2 Training for
HUMAID in project
management and
fundraising.

YES, in part. 3 HUMAID staff trained.

4

5

In May 2005, HI brought a resource person from Brussels
(Alexandra Mege) to lead an intensive training workshop on
fundraising and program development (May 30 – June 3, 2005).
As a follow-up to the fundraising workshop, HI organized an
exploratory fundraising trip with HUMAID to Dakar in October 2005
with the objective of meeting prospective donors.
In November 2005, HI organized a week-long intensive training
workshop on project methodology facilitated by a HI resource
person from the regional office in Burkina Faso (Bartelomey
Batieno).
HUMAID did not send a senior staff person to the international
Mine Action project management training course in Thailand in
September/October 2005.

1.3 Training for
HUMAID in
bookkeeping and
financial
management.

YES, in part. 1 HUMAID staff accompanied.
Formal training not required. Accompaniment provided
in budget development, financial monitoring and
reporting.
HI also provided extensive hands-on financial
management support in ensuring project accountability
vis-à-vis the EC.

3/5
From the perspective of
achieving desired outcomes in
terms of reduced risk and more
effective Mine Action, attention
to financial management was
not critical. However, from the
perspective of financial
management and accountability
to the EC as per required
norms, accompaniment in this
area was essential.

13

Note that this assessment of “importance” is that of the Evaluator. Some activities were seen to be
essential to achieving the desired outcomes while other activities were assessed as less vital to achieving
the desired outcomes. This scoring is not an assessment of the degree to which HI or the project was
successful in carrying out the activities --- observations on this are included in subsequent sections of the
report, but rather, an assessment of the degree to which the chosen activities were important to meeting the
desired results.
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Planned Activity

1.4 Establish
administrative,
financial and
human resource
systems within
HUMAID.

Carried Out
YES / NO
YES, in part
The HI-HUMAID Partnership Agreement established a Project
Management Committee that met monthly to coordinate project
activities and to provide a forum for HI’s technical assistance and
accompaniment on administrative and managerial issues.
HI’s strategy for organizational development included a participatory
base-line assessment of the state of affairs in administration,
finance, human resources and logistics and to compile an
Organizational Assessment document that would set the stage for
on-going technical assistance and organizational development. To
this end HI organized and facilitated a series of 2-day workshops
with HUMAID on related aspects such as the HI-HUMAID
Partnership Agreement, organizational structure and Organigram,
job descriptions, etc, culminating in the presentation of the
Organizational Assessment in late 2005.

1.5 Develop
HUMAID’s
Standing Operating
Procedures
(SOPs).

Importance in
Achieving Desired
Result

3
Not because these
systems are not
important per se
but because
HUMAID had basic
procedures in place
prior to the project
and was
operational without
external technical
assistance.

NO

5

Both HI and HUMAID recognize the importance of developing
organizational SOPs for HUMAID. To date these SOPs have not
been developed --- and remain a priority in the final weeks of the
project.
HI also noted the intention in the mid-term narrative report to the EC
to provide support to the CAAMI in developing national operating
standards as a locally adapted version of the IMAS. This work also
has not been possible to date.

Activities for Result # 2 – More effective mine / UXO clearance in the urban and peri-urban areas
of Bissau.
2.1 Training in
IMAS.

YES, 60 HUMAID field staff trained.

5

In early 2005, at the start of the project, the HI Technical Advisor
assessed the competencies of 60 HUMAID deminers, group leaders,
paramedics, supervisors, quality control monitors and Community
Liaison workers during the regularly scheduled refresher training
course. At this time it was deemed necessary to extend the
refresher training by an additional two weeks (February 2-18, 2005).
The training included both theoretical and practical elements. HI
assessed competencies in written and practical tests.
A second refresher training course for HUMAID deminers, group
leaders, paramedics, supervisors, quality control monitors and
paramedics was carried out in September / October 2005.
The original proposal to introduce mine detection dogs was
abandoned early in the project as simply not viable. Similarly, the
plan to include mechanical clearance machinery was abandoned.
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Besides questions of technical appropriateness and suitability to the
clearance terrain and tasks, there was no budget support for these
activities within the project.
As reported by HI to the EC in the interim narrative report, HI
decided to focus training on manual demining and EOD.
2.2 Training
sessions for
HUMAID on survey
techniques, data
collection, MRE,
EOD, use of mine
detection dogs, and
mechanical
demining.

In part.

3

In addition to training in MRE provided by the HI Community Liaison
Technical Advisor, HI sent a MRE specialist from HI headquarters
(Sophie Bonichon) in August 2005 to train the HUMAID Community
Liaison team in MRE and community liaison and to provide technical
support to developing a Community Liaison Strategy and work plan
for 2005.
After long procurement delays, HI acquired GPS devices and
compasses for training in survey techniques and mapping which was
carried out in January/February 2006.
As noted above, mine detection dogs and mechanical demining
were removed from the plan.

2.3 Technical
accompaniment
and supervision in
the field.

2.4 Create and
operationalize 2
EOD
teams.

YES

5

HI provided regular accompaniment and supervision to HUMAID
deminers on-the-job.
Early in the project, HI also attended weekly technical coordination
meetings held by HUMAID.
In part

5

There were delays in implementing EOD training. The first training
session was held August 8 -19, 2005 with 10 HUMAID deminers, 10
LUTCAM deminers and 2 CAAMI participants. HUMAID and
LUTCAM deminers were selected for the course using a written test
developed by HI. The top 10 participated. CAAMI provided the
training room and meals but was not able to secure the necessary
explosives for the practical training.
The practical EOD training was only carried out in February 2006.

2.5 Equip HUMAID
with the necessary
vehicles and
materials for
clearance activities.

The plan was to form an EOD team of 6 people in HUMAID and
another within LUTCAM. These teams have not yet been
operationalized.
YES
Some changes were made to the original plan for procurement, and
these changes were documented and communicated to the EC. No
changes required formal amendments to the contractual agreement
with the EC.
Most procurement orders were processed by June 2005, but
requests for exceptions to the rules of origin requirements resulted in
long delays in procurement.

3
HUMAID had a
supply of basic
materials and
equipment to
continue operations
prior to and through
most of the project
period.
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Planned Activity

2.6 Train, equip
and establish a
Community Liaison
team to facilitate
clearance activities,
carry out MRE and
collect data on
dangerous areas.

Carried Out
YES / NO

Importance in
Achieving
Desired Result

YES, 5 HUMAID staff trained.

4

rd

HI brought in a 3 Technical Advisor position outside the project budget
who worked to support the HUMAID Community Liaison team provide
information to communities on clearance activities, collect data on
dangerous areas (primarily UXO contamination) and educate the public to
reduce the threat of mine / UXO incidents.
The HI Technical Advisor developed job descriptions for the CL team,
evaluated the competencies of existing team members, recommended
restructuring the team, coordinated the recruitment of new CL staff,
developed a training plan, and trained the team in participatory techniques
(June 14, 2005), PEPAM (July 7/8, 2005), data collection and mapping
(July/August, 2005).
As noted, in August 2005 a PEPAM specialist from HI France carried out a
2-week training course on MRE and community mapping, and assisted in
developing a community liaison strategy for HUMAID.

Activities for Result # 3 – Improved coordination between HUMAID and the CAAMI.
3.1 Improve the
quantity and quality of
reports submitted by
HUMAID to the CAAMI
in support of national
data collection and
coordination.
3.2 Facilitate
HUMAID’s participation
in collective work on
national Mine Action
Standards.

YES, in part

3.3 Include other
Mine Action actors in
technical training by /
through the CAAMI.

YES – with EOD training

3.4 Contribute to a
Landmine Impact study
in close collaboration
with other Mine Action
actors in GuineaBissau.

5

Through the life of the project HUMAID submitted monthly
reports to the CAAMI. Some improvements in the quality of the
reports were noted.

NO

4

Was to be done in early 2006 but has not happened.

4

HI took the position that “each demining NGO carries out
demining training independently” such that manual demining
training facilitated by HI was carried out only with HUMAID.
EOD training was coordinated through the CAAMI and
participants were selected from both HUMAID and LUTCAM.
CAAMI Quality Control Monitors were also asked to participate.
NO
This activity depends on the CAAMI, and it is not clear to what
degree HI or HUMAID could have contributed or participated
within the budgetary and programmatic confines of the project
had an Impact Survey been implemented during the life of the
project.

2
Given the project
focus on Bissau
where the clearance
tasks were/are
delineated, this
activity would seem
to fall outside the
scope of the project
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4.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS & LESSONS-LEARNED
IN AREAS OF INTERVENTION
4.1

Organizational Capacity-Building
Overview
Capacity-Building Approach & Priorities
HUMAID’s Management Capacity
HI Accompaniment
The Workshops
Budget Support & Financial Management
Procurement & Logistics
HUMAID’s Organizational Structure
Governance
Communication

Overview



HI fulfilled its contractual obligations to provide administrative, financial and logistical
training and accompaniment to HUMAID as per the proposal submitted to, and
funded by the EC.



Three HI technical advisors provided full-time capacity-building support to HUMAID,
over and above the two advisors originally envisioned and funded within the project
budget. While only one of the three advisors was dedicated to administrative and
managerial training and accompaniment on a regular basis, the third full-time staff
person represents a significant additional investment by HI toward completion of
project objectives.



The project budget covered HUMAID salaries and operational costs for 2005.
Outside the project budget, HI partially funded HUMAID salaries for the final three
months of the project - January to March 2006. This additional budgetary support to
HUMAID is critical in that it allowed HUMAID to remain operational and project
activities to continue through the life of the project.



HI’s organizational capacity-building strategy included: 1) administrative, financial
and logistical accompaniment, 2) facilitating a series of workshops on organizational
development themes, 3) compiling an Organizational Assessment document, 4)
providing external HI resource people for week-long intensive training workshops on
project management and fundraising, and 5) international training in Mine Action
Project Management for a HUMAID senior manager. Except for the failure of
HUMAID to participate in international management training, all other components
of the organizational capacity-building strategy proceeded as planned.



HI’s training and accompaniment of HUMAID resulted in improved administrative
systems, information systems, logistics, budget monitoring and reporting.
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The potential results of the capacity-building strategy were not fully realized due to a
number of factors including: HUMAID’s resistance to change; HUMAID’s limited
engagement with HI towards organizational development objectives; HI’s
technocratic approach to training and accompaniment; the lack of strategic
leadership within HUMAID and the lack of strategic engagement by HI to address
HUMAID’s strategic needs; HI’s steadfast determination to stick with the plan;
limited human resources; and limited time.



The 15-month project timeframe was too short to achieve the desired capacitybuilding results.



Both HI and HUMAID found the dual role of the HI Administrator / Technical Advisor
as an advisor/trainer and as a financial controller/manager to be uncomfortable and
a hindrance to capacity-building objectives. HI believed that the two functions were
methodologically incompatible and needed to be separated in different positions.



It was important for HI to avoid doing the work for HUMAID. Instead of working
together with HUMAID, HI set themselves apart as advisors and trainers. HUMAID
was instructed and then regularly failed to execute as instructed. HI monitored and
documented HUMAID’s lack of progress. Had HI spent more time working together
with HUMAID, mentoring by example and providing on-the-job accompaniment,
there probably would have been greater synergy toward project objectives.



If the implicit objective of HUMAID’s capacity-building was to ensure organizational
survival (and by extension a sustainable local Mine Action capacity), then
developing strategic leadership within HUMAID and supporting HUMAID in
occupying ‘political’ space as the preeminent mine clearance NGO in Guinea-Bissau
should have been a priority for HI. Developing strategic leadership would have
required a different approach by HI in organizational training and accompaniment.



Most of HI’s capacity-building strategy was technically sound and well-executed at a
micro-level but did not resonate with HUMAID or address HUMAID’s strategic
priorities. It needed to be OK for HI to change course mid-way and to adapt the
capacity-building strategy and work plan in accordance with what was working and
not working with HUMAID and contributing to the desired results.



If at the end of the project HUMAID finds itself without funding to continue and little
‘political’ support to continue, one has to question whether all the technically good
administrative and managerial training really mattered. In this light, the HUMAID
Directors’ limited engagement in the project and resistance to most capacity-building
aspects is not constructive, but is understandable.

(For an overview of HUMAID’s organizational performance, See ANNEX F – HUMAID
Organizational Assessment)
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Capacity-Building Approach & Priorities



HUMAID’s Director did not consider administrative and managerial accompaniment
necessary, evidenced by HUMAID’s history of securing funds and producing results,
and therefore did not foster an environment in which the HUMAID staff proactively
engaged with HI towards organizational development objectives. Although the
Partnership Agreement signed between HI and HUMAID outlined collaboration in
capacity-building activities, the fundamental difference in perception and priorities
guaranteed tension.



Given the low-level tension and obvious passive resistance by HUMAID to
managerial supports HI needed to bring the HUMAID leadership to the table to
hash-out a shared vision and to jointly determine where to focus energies. In the
end, this may have led to a different capacity-building work-plan more closely
aligned with HUMAID priorities and strategic interests, which in turn would have
resulted in a higher degree of engagement on the part of HUMAID. This is not to
say, critical administrative, finance, logistics and human resource supports should
have all been ignored, but that the investment of time and energy should have
principally been focused on strategic work serving HUMAID’s medium-term
interests.



HI identified the need to strengthen strategic leadership within HUMAID, but in
practice, focused training and accompaniment more on managerial skills and
administrative systems rather than positioning HUMAID for medium term
sustainability in Mine Action.



HI did organize a fundraising / profile-raising trip with HUMAID to Dakar,Senegal in
October 2005. The trip did not result in any concrete funding opportunities for
HUMAID, which HI attributes to HUMAID’s lack of preparation (poor documentation
and presentation), as much as the general lack of donor interest in Guinea-Bissau.
HI expressed frustration with HUMAID’s lack of follow-through given all the supports
that HI did give to HUMAID in preparation for the trip (assistance in developing a
concept note with budget and donor-briefing). The Director of HUMAID, on the other
hand, does not acknowledge any short-comings on HUMAID’s part, and questions
the value-added of HI in fundraising. Objectively, one can observe that, indeed,
HUMAID was not well-prepared and did not present well. The organization did not
and still does not have an updated brochure, marketing materials or targeted
concept papers. While one can appreciate HI’s stance as an advisor vs “do-er”, in
this instance, more direct collaboration and channeling of HI’s technical assistance
and supports to the marketing of HUMAID would have been strategic.



The Organizational Assessment of HUMAID was a big job for HI, resulting in an
impressive comprehensive organizational review. The Assessment identified
HUMAID’s strengths and weaknesses in administration, finance, logistics and
human resources and outlined in great detail what still needs to be done for
HUMAID to improve. In the context of a 15-month project with no on-going funding
secured, the investment in what could be seen to be a long “to-do list for HUMAID”
just as their funding dries up, could be questioned. The Assessment was well-done,
however it is questionable as to whether this substantial investment of time and
energy contribute in equal measure to HUMAID’s organizational sustainability, and
by extension, to a more efficient and effective Mine Action in Guinea Bissau.
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The Organizational Assessment could, in fact, be used by HUMAID to leverage
funding if HI was to assist HUMAID in formatting and packaging the Assessment
with this objective in mind.

HUMAID’s Management Capacity



HI considered the recruitment of a Deputy Director and the re-organization of
existing human resources within HUMAID to be critical to developing management
and leadership capacity within the organization. The Director of HUMAID rejected
the planned recruitment of a new Deputy, preferring to strengthen the capacity of
the existing senior management team. The Head of Operations, with a grade nine
education, who had been the de facto Deputy formally assumed this role within
HUMAID.



HI worked closely with the Deputy Director to build his management capacity and an
intensive 6-month English course was provided in the hope he would acquire the
language skills necessary to access international training, work with project
documentation and inter-face with international donors. To date, the language
classes have not been particularly successful.



HI experienced resistance on the part of the HUMAID Director to developing BissauGuinean leadership within HUMAID.



It was assumed that UNDP would fund the participation of a HUMAID delegate to
the international Mine Action Management training course organized by Cranfield
University. UNDP did offer to subsidize HUMAID’s participation in the course held
in Thailand in September / October 2005, but much to the dismay of HI, HUMAID
did not participate in the course. The need for management training was simply not
prioritized by HUMAID’s Director who does not acknowledge the significance of the
lost training opportunity. Members of HUMAID”s senior management team, on the
other hand, did lament the lost opportunity.

HI Accompaniment



The decision by HI to maintain a separate office rather than have the technical
advisors be based within HUMAID has arguments for and against. In retrospect, it
may have been more effective to have established counterpart / mentoring roles inhouse within HUMAID. The accompaniment would have been more fluid and there
would have been more “working together” rather than accompaniment as an activity
in and of itself separate from the productive work day-to-day. Given the short
timeframe for the project, working together in the same physical space day-to-day
may have also moved things forward at a quicker pace.



HI required that HUMAID submit written requests for the kinds of technical
assistance and training that could have been undertaken in a more informal, day-today fashion had HI advisors been working in the same physical space. For example,
the need for tutoring in Excel was identified early in the project but has not
happened because HI is still waiting for HUMAID’s written request for this training.
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This anecdotal example serves to highlight how differences in communication styles
and ways of working hindered progress. Given HUMAID’s ‘ways of working’,
accompaniment ‘as a process rather than an event’ may have been more
productive.



The Partnership Agreement established a Project Management Committee that met
monthly and served as a forum to coordinate project activities and to facilitate
communications between HI and HUMAID and internally within HUMAID. HUMAID
insisted that internal communications were never an issue, but there is ample
evidence to suggest this is not the case and that the Project Management
Committee helped to alleviate some of the communication deficits.



Had HI technical advisors been based in HUMAID’s office, many of the operational
issues dealt with in the monthly Project Management Committee meetings would
have likely been coordinated in day-to-day contacts, and other periodic meetings of
the Technical and Administrative staff. The Management meetings could have then
been used to address more strategic matters.

The Workshops



HUMAID insisted that the HI workshop approach was “textbook training” and “not so
helpful”; that “HI was not responsive to HUMAID’s input” in terms of training
priorities and approaches; that scheduling was determined by HI and inflexible; and
that HI was too directive. One can observe that the workshop methodology and
content was largely pre-packaged by HI and participation was limited to filling in the
blanks. On the other hand, HI repeatedly changed the dates of workshops to
facilitate HUMAID’s participation and actively solicited HUMAID’s input and
feedback on training modules. HI also developed preparatory materials,
documented the workshops and produced follow-up documents (in English).



HI further brought in additional resource people from headquarters and the West
Africa regional office for two 5-day workshops on project management and
fundraising. The pedagogic materials produced for these workshops were excellent
and the workshops were positively evaluated by the HUMAID participants - except
for the concern that the intensive full-time nature of the training did not permit
HUMAID managers to attend to day-to-day operational demands.



Despite, HI’s best efforts to provide quality training opportunities, The workshops
came to be regarded by the HUMAID leadership as interruptions in the work-plan.
As a result HUMAID did not engage in the workshops in a strategic way, opting
instead to minimally participate, filling in the blanks as directed.

Budget Support & Financial Management



HI facilitated a participatory process with HUMAID to revisit and revise the project
budget at the start of the project as some time had passed since the original budget

20

Building Local Mine Action Capacity in Guinea-Bissau – Project Evaluation Report (March 2006)

was developed. HI communicated all line item changes to the EC (though none
required formal amendments to the HI-EC contract14).



Budget support to HUMAID averaged €38,747 per month over 2005 of which
approximately 75% was personnel costs covering the 77 HUMAID staff. HUMAID
had negotiated substantial salary support at what is most likely an unsustainable
level. HUMAID deminers were paid considerably more than their counterparts in
LUTCAM15. The discrepancies in salaries between HUMAID and LUTCAM led the
CAAMI to work on an updated national salary scale in an effort to standardize
salaries.



As of January 2006, the EC budget for HUMAID salaries was fully expended and HI
offered to cover partial salary costs to the end of the project. In effect the reduced
funds forced a strategic discussion on salaries but the HUMAID leadership has not
fully grappled with the issue. The salary of the Director, in particular, presents many
questions that HUMAID has avoided and may not effectively address unless / until
the governing body of the organization is brought into the discussion.



The budget support for HUMAID was detailed and restricted. Every expenditure
required pre-approval by HI. HI directly administered the budget and documented
any changes to approved expenditures, even as small as €15, in formal
amendments to the HI-HUMAID Partnership Agreement. This level of budgetary
control was justified by the level of detail in the original budget proposal to the EC
and by HI’s direct procurement of project materials and the need to avoid over-lap
and confusion.



Final detailed reporting on expenditures was not available at the time of the
Evaluation, but interim reporting would suggest that the project budget has been
fully expended and tightly controlled as per approved line items.



The project budget included minimal office and running costs for both HUMAID and
HI. The difference for HUMAID, however, was that they had no other sources of
funding to complement the project budget, while HI did. Apparently, no efforts were
made by HUMAID and/or HI during the year to secure additional funding for
HUMAID’s running costs.



The HUMAID Finance Manager is relatively well-qualified and experienced. Formal
training in bookkeeping was not necessary. HI did, however, provide regular
accompaniment and supervision to HUMAID’s Finance Manager, introducing
improvements in systems and procedures.

14

As reported by HI. It was beyond the scope of the Evaluation to verify financial details.
In 2000 the CAAMI negotiated a salary scale for HUMAID, presumably to facilitate short-term UNDP
budget support. HUMAID presented a proposal with very high salaries but settled on a salary scale more in
line with national realities. At the time deminers were paid $250. By 2004, HUMAID deminers were being
paid approx. €300 in local currency (200,000 CFA) while LUTCAM deminers were making approx. €200
(132,000 CFA). Salary differentials for senior field staff and management staff were even more
pronounced. The HUMAID Director’s salary is higher than some Country Director positions for large
international Mine Action NGOs.

15
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From the donor perspective, the project budget was very well-managed. However
one could question whether HI’s budgetary controls allowed HUMAID to develop
capacity in budget management or donor reporting.

Procurement & Logistics



The project budget included close to €100,000 for Materials and Equipment, of
which some €65,000 were earmarked for demining materials and equipment for
HUMAID. Most of these materials and equipment had to be procured
internationally.



International procurement was administered by HI. Local procurement carried out by
HUMAID was closely monitored. As noted previously, HI documented all approved
expenditures in formal amendments to the HI-HUMAID Partnership Agreement.



Requests for exceptions to the EC rules of origin requirements resulted in lengthy
delays in procurement. The bulk of project materials and equipment were delivered
to HUMAID during the external evaluation in the last month of the project. The EC
in Guinea-Bissau acknowledged that these delays in processing approvals for
exceptions were a constraint to project implementation.



HUMAID stated that they did not have the information on the international suppliers
and were not involved in procurement handled by HI. This calls into question
whether HUMAID was strengthened in its capacity to procure independently after
the project. The objectives of efficiency and effectiveness might outweigh capacitybuilding objectives and therefore justify HI’s handling of international procurement.
However, the long delays meant that neither capacity-building nor efficiency
objectives were met.



HI worked with HUMAID to improve internal logistics systems and procedures and
identified the need for a dedicated Logistics Officer. Given limited funding, HUMAID
was unable to recruit a new Logistics Officer and did not consider it enough of a
priority to re-structure other positions to ensure a dedicated position.



Given HUMAID’s operational capacity, the internal logistics somehow functioned /
function. That said, one could observe the need for on-going technical support and
accompaniment. Inventory documents are incomplete and without dates, store
rooms are completely unorganized and systematic stock controls are just being
introduced.

HUMAID’s Organizational Structure



HI identified HUMAID’s organizational structure as a problem and considerable time
and energy was invested in assisting HUMAID re-structure, develop an new
Organigram and update job descriptions. HUMAID staff commented that it helped to
have greater clarity on roles and responsibilities. The HUMAID Director, however,
felt the work was unnecessary as “everyone knows what their job is” and “we just
changed the titles, but everything is the same”.
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Governance



HUMAID has a Board of Directors (Mesa da Assembleia) of some repute, including
an ex-President, judge, President of the Electoral Commission, etc. Unfortunately,
this governing body appears to exist on paper only. Though comments were made
by the Director of the CAAMI to the effect that influential people are actively backing
HUMAID, HI could not observe any practical (or political) benefits to HUMAID as a
result of its well-connected Board of Directors. Through the life of the project, the
Board has not met and HI has had no contact with Board members.



Given the strategic challenges in Mine Action in Guinea Bissau and the critical
moment in HUMAID’s organizational development (and survival), re-establishing a
functional governing body should have been a priority in HI’s support to HUMAID.

Communication



Hi was systematic in documenting the terms of the HI-HUMAID partnership, all
communications between HI and HUMAID, all project-related decisions, and all
project activities. The paper-work produced by HI was impressive.



The HI technical advisors were able to communicate effectively in French, English
and Portuguese.



HUMAID noted that there was a lack of “real dialogue” and that HI was sensitive to
criticism and questioning of the capacity-building process. On the other hand, HI
was continually frustrated by HUMAID’s lack of responsiveness and
professionalism.



HI’s communication style, favoring written documentation over informal dialogue and
discussion, seemed to be at odds with HUMAID’s less-structured communication
style. The Evaluator was left with the impression that the HI-HUMAID collaboration
would have been more effective if the partners had just talked more, had lunch
together, strategized together, disagreed and hashed things out on a regular basis -- the kinds of communicating that can not be done through written memos.



The organizational capacity-building documentation and all financial documentation
for the project was mostly in English. This might have limited HI’s objective of
strengthening Bissau-Guinean leadership within HUMAID as, in particular, the
Deputy Director was not able to work effectively in English.
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4.2

Technical Training & Accompaniment (Demining /
EOD)
Overview
Training in IMAS & Manual Demining
Technical Accompaniment & Field Supervision
EOD Training
Standing Operating Procedures
HUMAID”s Operational Capacity
Quality Control

Overview



The technical components of the project included 1) training in manual demining
and IMAS, 2) day-to-day accompaniment and supervision of clearance tasks carried
out by HUMAID, 3) data collection and mapping techniques, and 4) EOD training
with HUMAID, LUTCAM and the CAAMI.



The technical components of the project were relatively well-understood and wellreceived by HUMAID. Unlike managerial supports that met with some resistance,
technical supports in demining and EOD were welcomed. The HUMAID leadership
voiced concerns about reduced productivity as a result of training, but for the most
part, HUMAID constructively engaged with HI towards technical outcomes.



The presence of a full-time demining / EOD expert in the country provided an
important human resource to HUMAID, to the CAAMI, and to a lesser extent to
LUTCAM.



The HI demining / EOD expert also served as the HI Project Manager. This double
work-load was noted as a limitation on both fronts. The two roles did not present
the same challenges as those experienced by the HI Administrator and Technical
Advisor to HUMAID on managerial issues who struggled with the incompatibilities of
the trainer/controller roles, but there were challenges nonetheless.



The degree to which HUMAID and the CAAMI took full advantage of the HI
Technical Trainer / Advisor for maximum value-added could be questioned. The
delays in establishing the basic conditions for EOD training, not moving ahead with
adapting national Mine Action Standards, delays in developing Standing Operating
Procedures for HUMAID…are some examples of the HI human resource not being
used to full advantage.

Training in IMAS & Manual Demining



At the start of the project in January 2005 the HI Technical Advisor decided to
extend the demining “refresher” training underway by an additional two weeks to
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address a number of immediate safety and technical concerns. At the time, HI
assessed the need for technical training and field supervision as “urgent”.



HUMAID deminers were assessed in written and practical tests. The average score
on the written test was 13/20. Of the 47 written tests only 12 (25%) scored 12 or
more out of 20. Of the 25 (51%) who scored under 10/20, 13 (27%) could not do the
test at all because of illiteracy.



Of the 38 HUMAID deminers, 26 (68%) were born before 1960 and 5 (13%) before
1950. There is a definite correlation between age and literacy. 31 of 38 (82%) have
less than a 6th grade education and are functionally illiterate. Some are unable to
even write their name. A particular challenge for technical training in HUMAID’s
case is the fact that the Field Supervisor and Assistant Supervisor are both among
the older war veterans and functionally illiterate. This challenging training context
was further complicated by language --- the dominant common language is Creole
and not all demining staff speaks or writes Portuguese.



The HI Technical Advisor had to adapt training materials and methodologies to
counter these language and literacy barriers.



Communication issues related to language and literacy were not assessed as
problematic by HUMAID. For the most part training was conducted in Portuguese
(although audio-visual materials were provided in English, French and Portuguese)
and efforts were made to include translation into Creole when necessary and verbal
testing for those deminers unable to read and write.



The basic deminer training courses facilitated by the HI Technical Advisor
introduced new techniques as per IMAS. HUMAID deminers noted three areas in
which they had adopted new and improved techniques: 1) kneeling instead of
standing, 2) security spacing and marking, and 3) the timing of rotations.



Although the Director of HUMAID downplayed the importance of new techniques,
the deminers themselves welcomed the training saying “we feel safer now” and “we
learned a lot with HI” and “the project should continue”. HUMAID field staff also
commented that “we used to spend a lot of money on clearance supplies” but the HI
Technical Advisor “helped us use materials more efficiently”.



HUMAID deminers, team leaders and field supervisors appear well-versed in IMAS
(noting that the application of this knowledge could not be observed first-hand
during the Evaluation).



The CAAMI and UNDP CTA observed that HUMAID’s technical capacity and
adherence to IMAS significantly improved with HI technical training and
accompaniment.



HUMAID believes it has the capacity to operate independently in manual demining
in line with IMAS. A final assessment of technical capacity should be included in HI’s
final reporting on the project, but it would seem there is some confidence in
HUMAID’s capacity to carry out standard mine clearance operations independently
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with periodic refresher training and systematic quality assurance both internally and
by the CAAMI.

Technical Accompaniment & Field Supervision



Day-to-day accompaniment and supervision of clearance tasks carried out by the HI
Technical Advisor was welcomed and valued by HUMAID’s field staff.



Given the learning challenges among a diverse group of deminers, many
functionally illiterate with limited Portuguese (the Field Supervisors among these),
continuous on-the-ground supervision by HI assured the systematization of
improved practices introduced in training sessions.



HUMAID was supported in improving its storage of explosives for EOD, and
warehousing demining materials and equipment.



HI also worked with HUMAID to establish proper procedures for medical support to
demining operations as per IMAS. HUMAID had two ambulances prior to the project
but project support ensured they were properly equipped and that Paramedics
received refresher training.



As per CAAMI directives, HUMAID worked on three clearance tasks during 2005:
Enterramento, Bor and Plaque 1. A total of 60,140 m2 were cleared. HI monitored
field operations on a regular basis.



At some point HI made a decision to not participate in the HUMAID Technical
Meetings, prioritizing instead the Project Management Committee meetings.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Training



EOD training was considered by all players as a major contribution of the project.



After months of delay due to complications in securing explosives through the
CAAMI for practical demonstrations, the first phase of theoretical training got
underway in August 2005. The explosives never materialized and the practical
training was postponed until February 2006. When the practical training finally did
take place in February 2006, there were problems even at that point in securing the
availability of the promised explosives through the CAAMI. HUMAID’s operational
stock of explosives was used at the last minute to avoid aborting the training in the
eleventh hour of the project.



Given that the EOD training was identified as a national Mine Action priority, and the
project provided in-country EOD expertise for only a limited period of time, one has
to call into question either CAAMI’s support for the project or influence vis-à-vis the
government and military. At the end of the day the delays in securing explosives to
carry out the training as a precursor to EOD operations represented a lost
opportunity for Guinea-Bissau.
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One could also question whether HI was proactive and/or political enough in
securing the conditions to move forward with the much needed training.



The strategy for EOD was to select the “best and brightest” deminers from HUMAID
and LUTCAM to be trained and subsequently to form two EOD teams. Each
organization identified 15 deminers to be tested and the top 10 from each
organization was selected to participate. The average score on the selection test for
the top 20 candidates was 12/20. The majority of the top scorers were the younger /
newer demining recruits.



The Director of LUTCAM and two Quality Control Monitors from the CAAMI also
participated in the EOD training. It would have been appropriate for the HUMAID
Field Supervisor to also participate in the training but his illiteracy precluded this
option.



From August 8-15, 2005 the HI Technical Advisor facilitated 40 hours of EOD
theoretical training covering: IMAS, battlefield contamination, explosives theory,
safety measures, submunitions, ammunitions, grenades, artillery, rockets, and
bombs. PowerPoints with extensive visual aids were used in the training.



HI tested the trainees during the course to measure their progress. The first testing
produced low scores averaging 7.4/20. Final tests showed an average of 11.2/20
for HUMAID trainees, 10.3/20 for LUTCAM trainees and 10.75/20 for the CAAMI
trainees. HUMAID’s highest score was 12.75/20.



For the EOD refresher theory and practical training held in February 2006, 12 of the
best trainees from the August course were selected to participate, six each from
LUTCAM and HUMAID. The training was once again held in the CAAMI training
room, but CAAMI personnel did not participate. In terms of general support from the
CAAMI for the EOD training, the UNDP CTA did comment that the CAAMI was not
able to provide lunches for the second phase of the EOD training in February 2006
as they had done for the first session in August 2005, due to budgetary restrictions.



Presumably the HI Technical Advisor will evaluate all EOD trainees and make
recommendations to HUMAID, LUTCAM and the CAAMI as to who should be
selected to form permanent EOD teams.



HI and the UNDP CTA have indicated that EOD requires technical supervision.
Given the fast approaching end-date for the project and the departure of the HI EOD
expert it is not clear how and when the EOD work will continue.
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Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)



The project proposal identified the need for HUMAID to produce Standing Operating
Procedures in line with IMAS (and/or National Operating Procedures if they
existed)16.



All parties agree that the SOPs were/are a priority. HI and HUMAID lamented the
fact that work on the SOPs had not begun to-date. HUMAID identified the SOPs as
the priority for collaboration with HI in the final weeks of the project.

HUMAID’s Operational Capacity



HUMAID believes it has the capacity to operate independently in manual demining
in line with IMAS. A final assessment of technical capacity should be included in HI’s
final reporting on the project, but it would seem there is confidence in HUMAID’s
capacity to carry out standard mine clearance operations independently with
periodic refresher training and systematic quality assurance both internally and by
the CAAMI.

Quality Control



Most of the area cleared by HUMAID before and during the project period has not
yet been verified by the CAAMI Quality Control Monitors. Very little quality control
seems to have been carried out during 2005. HUMAID lamented the slow pace of
follow-up on the part of the CAAMI. It is not clear whether this was a problem related
to CAAMI’s capacity, coordination or priorities.

.

4.3

Community Liaison & Mine Risk Education
Overview
HUMAID’s Community Liaison Team
Mine Risk Education (MRE)
Data Collection

Overview



The project proposal included training in Community Liaison (CL) and MRE. It is not
clear how these activities would have been implemented without the addition of a
third technical advisor outside the project budget.



The project proposal also made reference to HI and HUMAID contributing to an
impact survey initiative but did not specify exactly how, or include budget allocations
for training and technical assistance in this area.

16

IMAS Standard 09.30 on EOD established that “demining organizations with an integral EOD capability
must prepare SOPs for neutralization and disarming procedures which are appropriate to the UXO threat
and are consistent with accepted international EOD practice.”
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The addition of a third Technical Advisor in Community Liaison to the HI project
team in April 2005 enabled the development of community liaison, data collection,
mapping, and MRE capacity within HUMAID.



Data collection and training in survey techniques were supported by the HUMAID
leadership but project interventions in other aspects of community liaison and MRE
were not well understood nor considered a priority.



The CAAMI Director and the UNDP CTA did not appear to have a good sense of the
CL and MRE work being developed and carried out by HUMAID with HI technical
assistance.

HUMAID’s Community Liaison Team



The HI Technical Advisor in Community Liaison assessed the capacities of the
existing CL team in HUMAID and based on this assessment recommended a restructuring of the team and the recruitment of new staff.



HI developed the terms of reference for CL staff and coordinated recruitment. With
a 4-person team in place, HI developed a training plan integrating elements of MRE,
data collection and IMSMA, mapping techniques, and reporting on ‘dangerous
areas’. The objectives of the CL team were to educate communities to prevent mine
/ UXO incidents, to provide information to communities on clearance activities, and
to collect data on mine / UXO contamination. The CL team was provided with
educational tools, basic materials and vests.



The work-plan for the CL team was further developed with technical support from
HI’s Lyon-based MRE specialist during her field mission to Guinea-Bissau in August
2005.



The place of the CL team within HUMAID’s organizational structure resulted in weak
supervision and limited involvement by HUMAID’s senior managers in the CL work.
In the absence of hands-on supervision, HI’s Technical Advisor for Community
Liaison effectively assumed a coordination function vis-à-vis the CL team. A more
formal counterpart and mentoring arrangement with the HUMAID staff person
responsible for the CL team would have increased the chances of the work
continuing at the end of the project.



Better internal communication within HUMAID and between HI and HUMAID as to
the work of the CL team would have facilitated a higher level of organizational
‘ownership’ for the work. To a certain extent, the lack of support for CL and MRE
activities on the part of the HUMAID leadership resulted from poor communication
and information-sharing.
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Mine Risk Education



HUMAID’s MRE is linked to clearance activities and a responsibility of the CL team.
It was not expected that HUMAID would develop a comprehensive MRE strategy
de-linked from its clearance work.



The project proposal indicated that ANDES, a previous partner NGO of HI in
Guinea-Bissau, would be enlisted to train and mentor HUMAID staff. For a number
of reasons ANDES was never involved in project activities.



HI developed training curricula for MRE and carried out three training courses with
the HUMAID CL team in June, July and August 2005. These courses were wellreceived by the CL team but were not mentioned in HUMAID’s monthly reports to
the CAAMI.



The HI MRE Specialist from Lyon provided two full days of training in MRE in
August 2005.



Albeit limited in scope, the MRE carried out by HUMAID as part of the community
liaison work over the course of the project might be the only MRE undertaken in
Guinea-Bissau during 2005.



Given project investments in training, program coordination and accompaniment in
this area it would be a lost opportunity if HUMAID was to remain out of the MRE
loop. While it remains a responsibility of HUMAID to pursue this engagement in
MRE, it behooves HI to ensure there is some form of facilitated discussion so as to
delineate HUMAID’s current MRE capacities and future directions. Current work on
national MRE strategies coordinated by the CAAMI (with UNDP support) provides
an important opportunity for HUMAID to contribute its experience and participate in
program development, further enhancing the impact of the project



HUMAID submitted completed IMSMA forms on MRE activities to the CAAMI.

Data Collection



In January and February 2005 HUMAID staff was trained in IMSMA by the CAAMI
and visiting specialists from the GICHD. Members of the CL team were not among
the HUMAID staff trained.



HI worked with the CL team to identify ‘dangerous areas’ and to complete IMSMA
forms. IMSMA forms identifying and mapping the location of UXO were regularly
submitted by HUMAID to the CAAMI over 2005. No IMSMA reports have been
produced by the CAAMI indicating that this data has been used in determining
clearance priorities. The UNDP CTA has advised HUMAID that the latest version of
IMSMA with greater capacity to process UXO data is forthcoming.



In September 2005, HI trained the CL team in the use of a compass, establishing
coordinates, using the GPS, and mapping. This same training was later given to
HUMAID field supervisors, group leaders and quality control monitors in February
2006.
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The HUMAID leadership recognizes the importance of data collection but has not
ensured effective supervision and integration of the CL team in clearance activities.

4.4

Clearance & Threat Reduction
Clearance Objectives
HUMAID’s Productivity
HUMAID’s Contribution in Comparative Perspective

Clearance Objectives



A central objective of the project was to reduce the threat of landmines and UXO to
the population of Bissau. To this end, budget support was provided to HUMAID for
clearance operations including marking and MRE, mine clearance and UXO
disposal.



At the time the project was conceived it was expected that clearance in Bissau could
be completed by 2005. As such, the project sought to complete clearance in Bissau.
This goal was not realistic. That said, further progress could have been made
toward this goal had EOD training and subsequent EOD operations proceeded as
planned.

HUMAID’s Productivity



Except for periods of time when the HUMAID field staff was in training, HUMAID
maintained clearance operations on tasks assigned by the CAAMI.



As noted, HUMAID worked on three areas in 2005 in Bissau: Bor, Enterramento and
Plaque 1. A total of 60,140 m2 was cleared17.



Based on a contingent of 38 HUMAID deminers (supported by 21 additional field
staff, 4 community liaison staff and 13 administrative staff), the clearance output per
deminer averaged 1,583 m2 in 2005. With approximately 8 months of normal
operations, the productivity per deminer was roughly 198 m2 per month or 10 m2
per day based on full-time operations. The cost per m2 is difficult to ascertain given
the investment in capacity-building and considerable time and human resources
spent in training activities. A very rough cost calculation taking the total direct
project costs divided by metres cleared gives a cost of approximately €7.38 per m2.



The Director of HUMAID voiced concerns that the partnership with HI interfered with
HUMAID’s productivity. A comparison of HUMAID’s results in 2004 and 2005 or an

17

As reported in HUMAID’s monthly reports to the CAAMI. See ANNEX E (a and b) – HUMAID’s
Results 2000-2005.
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overview from 2001 would support the concern that productivity declined in 2005. In
2004, HUMAID cleared 115,294 m2 with a budget of approximately $500,000 USD.
The average area cleared per deminer was 3,034 m2 at an estimated cost of $4.34
per m2.



At the same time, HUMAID’s capacity for humanitarian demining as per IMAS was
significantly increased. With the increasing attention to quality and security in Mine
Action, HI assessed HUMAID’s productivity as acceptable.

HUMAID’s Contribution in Comparative Perspective



The project supported roughly 50% of clearance operations in Guinea-Bissau in
2005.



Production data from LUTCAM was not available for comparison purposes.

4.5

National Mine Action Coordination
Overview
Working Relations between HUMAID and the CAAMI
Reporting
National Mine Action Standards
Accreditation
National Coordination of EOD Training
Future Clearance Operations

Overview



HUMAID’s engagement in national coordination and working relations with the
CAAMI notably improved as a result of the project and HI accompaniment.



HUMAID’s ‘weight’ in Mine Action and ability to influence the direction of national
strategies and priorities does not seem to have increased as a result of the
partnership with HI.



HI appears to have underestimated the importance of proactive strategic
engagement at the national level, both for HUMAID and for HI to achieve its own
objectives for training and technical assistance.

Working Relations between HUMAID and the CAAMI



HUMAID noted that “HI helped a lot to improve relations with the CAAMI”. The new
UNDP CTA for Mine Action was also given credit for bringing people together and
promoting constructive working relations. The combined effect of HI’s facilitation
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and a new UNDP CTA marked the beginning of a new era in CAAMI-HUMAID
relations.

Reporting



The project sought to improve national coordination of Mine Action, primarily by
improving HUMAID”s reporting to the CAAMI. During the project HUMAID
submitted monthly reports to the CAAMI on clearance activities. Presumably the
CAAMI has entered this data in the IMSMA and has compiled detailed reporting for
verification. No such reports were available for review.



The inclusion of information from and about the Community Liaison team improved
the quality of the reports to the CAAMI, though they remained limited in their scope
(i.e. primarily reporting on quantifiable outputs with little analysis, discussion of
constraints, or lessons-learned).



As noted HUMAID submitted complete IMSMA forms on ‘dangerous areas’ and
MRE activities to the CAAMI, but it is not clear whether this data has been entered
into the database by the CAAMI

National Mine Action Standards



The CAAMI has not yet worked on a national adaptation of the IMAS. In the
meantime, Angolan and Mozambican interpretations have served as a reference
point.



Not taking advantage of the HI demining / EOD specialist to provide technical
support to this task was a lost opportunity for the CAAMI.

Accreditation



To date no formal accreditation process for Mine Action operators has been
introduced by the CAAMI. Neither HUMAID nor LUTCAM are formally accredited as
per international norms. The absence of formal accreditation has not affected
operations or the outcome of the project as clearance activities have not been
delayed as a result. However HUMAID, as an independent partner in Mine Action,
remains vulnerable without this accreditation.



HI does not appear to have advocated vis-à-vis the CAAMI to ensure the
accreditation of HUMAID within the project period.

National Coordination of EOD Training



HI coordinated with the CAAMI to train LUTCAM deminers and CAAMI Quality
Control Monitors in EOD along with HUMAID deminers. The CAAMI also provided
logistical supports and meals during the first phase of the training. This coordination
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ensured value-added and the best application of HI’s technical assistance and
expertise to national objectives.



The delays in securing explosives for the practical EOD training resulted in repeated
postponements of the training and significant time lost in a short project. In the end,
the training was not finished in time for HI to accompany the creation of EOD teams
within HUMAID and LUTCAM or to supervise actual EOD operations.



The fact that the CAAMI did not provide explosives for the practical training, even
after the practical training was delayed until the final month of the project, is an
indication that the CAAMI must be very weak in its capacity to support operations.
At the same time it is not clear whether HI proactively engaged with the CAAMI and
the Bissau-Guinean military to ensure availability of the explosives.

Future Clearance Operations



Beyond the HI project, the future of clearance operations in Guinea-Bissau is
uncertain. Although the National Plan for Completion written in May 2005 affirms
the need for the combined operational capacity of LUTCAM and HUMAID to achieve
‘completion’ by 2009, the current funding context would indicate there is little chance
of sufficient funding to maintain two separate clearance NGOs.



In this context, the CAAMI (and UNDP) should have facilitated some sort of open
discussion on fundable models for clearance in 2006 and beyond. HI should have
assisted HUMAID in engaging strategically in this process.



Informally the CAAMI has indicated its preference for centralized funding of
clearance operations through the CAAMI. In this scenario, HUMAID’s future is
doubtful ----unless there was some sort of merger with LUTCAM. There has been no
facilitated discussion of the possible scenarios.



Given HUMAID’s vulnerability at the end of the HI project, it is surprising that HI did
not assist HUMAID to occupy more ‘political space’ in Mine Action and to advocate
vis-à-vis the CAAMI and UNDP on behalf of HUMAID.
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5.

OTHER MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
5.1

18
19

Budget & Financial Considerations



A slightly revised project budget was tightly controlled and fully expended in
compliance with EC financial and procurement restrictions18.



HI’s office and personnel costs (€163,363) represented only 24% of the total
direct costs in the project budget, and perhaps as little as 20% of HI’s total real
costs. In the end, HI subsidized its own office and personnel costs well beyond
the EC project budget. A third full-time Technical Advisor and costs associated
with maintaining an HI office in Bissau are cases in point.



HI’s financial contribution to the project far surpassed the €138,057 contractual
commitment.



As HI had no other programmatic activities in the country besides the project all
additional investments by HI contributed directly or indirectly to the project.



The project budget only covered HUMAID’s salaries until December 2005, and
HI further subsidized these personnel costs for the final three months of the
project.



Some 76% of direct costs were allocated to HUMAID, of which 69% was
personnel costs. The budget included only 12 months of salary for HUMAID and
HI further subsidized HUMAID’s personnel costs for the period January to March
2006, over and above the project budget19.



Overall, HI’s financial contribution to the project expanded the total expenditure
well beyond the budget of €738,057, with HI’s share far exceeding the
contractual commitment of 19%.



HUMAID’s direct costs averaged approximately €43,000 per month in 2005.
HI’s additional funding support for HUMAID the first three months of 2006 is
considerably less than that provided in the project budget and HUMAID was
forced to reduce salaries and terminate contracts.



The project budget included very little organizational costs for either HI or
HUMAID. The budget line for consumables was particularly under-funded and
was a source of on-going tension between HUMAID and HI.



A detailed financial analysis of the project was beyond the scope of the
Evaluation.

Information provided by HI, but not verified. Financial analysis was outside the scope of the Evaluation.
HI’s additional funding for HUMAID January to March 2006 totals €67,560.
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5.2 HI Staffing


HI assembled a strong technical team in Bissau. The Director of the CAAMI
concurred that the HI project staff was “the best HI team ever”.



The combined technical expertise of the HI staff was comprehensive and
relevant to HUMAID’s needs and project objectives. Notwithstanding some
incompatibilities in communication styles and methodological approaches, HI
staff was systematic and skilled in training.



The language skills of all three HI staff were strong.



The dual responsibilities of the HI staff vis-à-vis HUMAID and in project and
office management limited the staff’s ability to engage in project activities. In
particular, the combined Project Manager / Demining & EOD Trainer/Advisor
position limited the possible technical interventions in demining and/ EOD.



In an ideal world, HI would have also separated the Administrator position and
the Management Advisor/Trainer position into two separate positions.



Given the strategic challenges faced by HUMAID it would have been beneficial
if there had been HI expertise in organizational and program development,
strategic planning, and policy advocacy, and someone who would have
constantly linked the technical work to strategic objectives and re-framed the
set-backs so as to continue to build momentum and synergy toward desired
results. HI did not engage with HUMAID on issues of strategic leadership or
with the CAAMI on issues of strategic directions in Mine Action -- the very
issues that will determine the project’s sustainability and impact.

5.3 EC Visibility


As per Article 6 of the EC General Conditions for External Actions regarding
Visibility, project documents all carried the EC logo. HI ensured that HUMAID
facilities, uniforms and project materials also carried the EC logo.



A formal project inauguration ceremony was coordinated with the EC
Delegation in Guinea-Bissau.
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6.

ASSESSING THE PROJECT’S RELEVANCE
6.1 Relevance to International Mine Action Policy &
Practice

KEY QUESTIONS
Did the EC / HI / HUMAID project correspond to current priorities in
international Mine Action?
Did the project promote International Mine Action Standards and best practice?
Did the project further the Completion Initiative by contributing to “finishing the job”
in Guinea-Bissau?
Did the project strengthen national ownership and capacity?
Did the project reduce reliance on international donors and external technical
assistance?

Did the EC / HI / HUMAID project correspond to current priorities in
international Mine Action? Did the project promote IMAS and best
practice?
In reducing the threat of landmines and UXO while building national capacities, and
improving national coordination through the CAAMI, the EC funded HI partnership
project with HUMAID is clearly situated within and subsumed under global Mine Action
policy and practice, and is a positive contribution to the collective effort to deal with mine
/ UXO threat in line with Mine Ban Treaty obligations, donor - and particularly EC
priorities.
Of note are the following developments in international Mine Action policy and practice,
all of which point to the relevance of the project:



The Mine Ban Treaty with 149 States Parties (and 154 signatories/accessions)
since 1997, including Guinea-Bissau.



Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty which states that State Parties must destroy mines
that have already been laid in mined areas under its jurisdiction and control, “as
soon as possible but not later than ten years” after ratifying the Convention.
Guinea-Bissau ratified the Convention in 2001.



Article 6 of the Treaty which outlines the need for international cooperation and
assistance in mine action, stating that “each state in a position to do so shall provide
assistance” for Mine Action programs.



The global response and momentum in Mine Action towards Treaty obligations and
the desired end state (be that mine-free, zero victim, or threat-free).

37

Building Local Mine Action Capacity in Guinea-Bissau – Project Evaluation Report (March 2006)



The UNDP-led Completion Initiative to ensure countries with relatively smaller
landmine / UXO problems are given sufficient support to “finish the job”, understood
as 1) clearing all high and medium impact areas of mines and ERW and 2) building
a residual capacity so that countries can address remaining problems with little or
no assistance from the international community. Guinea-Bissau is included in the
Completion Initiative.



The EC Mine Action 2002-2004 Strategy and Multi-Annual Indicative Programming
outlining 2 priority areas: 1) reducing the threat and 2) increasing local capacity for
efficient and effective programming, with particular mention of “management
capacity”.



The European Roadmap towards a Zero Victim Target – the EC Mine Action
Strategy and Multi-Annual Indicative Programming 2005-2007 envisioning a world
free from the threat of anti-personnel landmines and UXOs in which all “mine
affected countries themselves are able to take full control of their mine/UXO
problems”. The EC strategy seeks to define the problem as a finite one whereby
programming moves toward the desired end-state. The specific focus on the need
to increase efficiency and effectiveness in mine action emphasizes local capacitybuilding.



International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) developed as an operational framework
for all Mine Action,

With the specific focus on technical training, developing Standing Operating Procedures
(SOPs), and improved quality control, the project sought to promote and extend the
application of international standards in Guinea-Bissau.
Building on their extensive international experience in Mine Action, including integrated,
developmental and capacity-building approaches to Mine Action, HI positioned the
project to promote best practice through the integration of Community Liaison and MRE
in clearance activities.

Did the project further the Completion Initiative by contributing to
“finishing the job” in Guinea-Bissau?
By funding approximately 50% of the clearance capacity in Guinea-Bissau in 2005 the
project has contributed to Completion objectives. The focus on training and quality
control in clearance did result, however, in fewer square meters cleared over 2005 than
in previous years. The objective of “finishing” Bissau was not attainable in the time-span
of the project and is expected to take another year – or so- of operations20.

20

Exact estimates are not available. Based on the tasks remaining and the current clearance capacity, it is
unlikely Bissau could be completed before the end of 2006. Critical factors include funding for HUMAID
and LUTCAM, but also technical assistance and material conditions to carry out EOD.
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Did the project strengthen national ownership and capacity? Did the
project reduce reliance on international donors and external technical
assistance?
Capacity-building was both the main strategy of the project and an objective unto itself
such that HUMAID, and by extension - Guinea-Bissau would be better equipped to
address the mine / UXO problems without long-term reliance on external assistance.
Indeed, national capacities were strengthened and the need for external technical
assistance reduced, though not eliminated. The total reliance on external funding
continues.

6.2

Relevance in the National Context
KEY QUESTIONS

Was the project strategic in furthering national Mine Action priorities?
Was the project strategic in its capacity-building objectives? i.e. did the choice of
HUMAID as a partner make sense?

Was the project strategic in furthering national Mine Action priorities?
National Mine Action priorities included the elimination of the mine / UXO threat in
Bissau, survey to determine the exact nature of the contamination in the interior of the
country, and completion of these clearance tasks by 2009. Given the particular problem
presented by UXOs, the development of national EOD capacities was identified as a
priority. It is expected that local operators will carry out all clearance tasks21.
The HI-HUMAID partnership project - which provided budgetary and technical support to
HUMAID to complete clearance in Bissau as per international standards, to develop
EOD capacity in the country, and to strengthen the organizational capacity of HUMAID
to function independently of external accompaniment, was, in every respect, strategic in
furthering national priorities.
The project also contributed indirectly to peace-building and national reconciliation
through its constructive engagement with war veterans from both sides of recent
conflicts, bridging gulfs in understanding among the various actors in the Mine Action
sector, reducing the threat to civilian populations from mines and UXOs, and securing
enhanced livelihoods for war veteran deminers.

Was the project strategic in its capacity-building objectives? i.e. did the
choice of HUMAID as a partner make sense?
As no international Mine Action NGOs were present in Guinea-Bissau, strengthening
local operational capacity was a given. The dilemma in project design related to the
nature of this local capacity and the choice of partner.

21

The National Plan for Completion 2005-2009, prepared by UNDP (May 2005).
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In Guinea-Bissau there were two concurrent operational strategies: 1) creating and
developing an operational arm of the national Mine Action authority (CAAMI), eventually
evolving into a quase-independent national NGO, the strategy favored by UNDP (i.e.
LUTCAM), and 2) strengthening the capacity of a pre-existing independent local NGO as
a partner of the CAAMI (i.e. HUMAID) – the strategy favored by HI.
One could find good arguments for and against both strategies to build local operational
capacity22, but most agree that in the specific case of Guinea-Bissau, with its short to
medium term mine / UXO problem (albeit with some unknowns given the lack of survey
data outside the capital of Bissau) and limited donor engagement, that it is unlikely there
will be sufficient on-going funding to maintain two autonomous clearance
organizations23. That said, the National Plan for Completion 2005-2009 speaks of
clearance of all known mined areas and remaining UXOs in Guinea-Bissau by 200824,
depending on available funding, using national capacity in program delivery. And, to
achieve this goal the CAAMI and UNDP have stated that Guinea-Bissau needs the
combined operational capacity of both HUMAID and LUTCAM, or its equivalent.
Given that UNDP was exclusively supporting LUTCAM both financially and with
technical assistance and accompaniment, (leaving little room for additional partnerships
with LUTCAM), it was logical for HI to establish a partnership with HUMAID. One could
argue that support for HUMAID was the most strategic choice of partners given
HUMAID’s pre-existing organizational coherence, commitment to humanitarian demining
and proven operational capacity.

22

and a large school of thought suggesting that, given the finite and in many cases, short-term, nature of the
mine / UXO problem in Guinea-Bissau, the objective of Local Operational Capacity should not be the
focus at all but rather efficiency and effectiveness in whatever form. Roughly interpreted, efficiency and
effectiveness, is oft equated with bringing in the readily available and equipped international expertise to
get the job done as quickly and qualitatively as possible. In this case Mine Action is understood primarily
as a humanitarian endeavor de-linked from longer-term development processes and the associated
principles of local ownership, participation, and empowerment. The experience on the ground has led HI
staff to question whether capacity-building objectives might run counter to efficiency and effectiveness
objectives and have intimated that it probably would have been more efficient and effective for HI to
establish an operational capacity in Guinea-Bissau, using local personnel from the ranks of HUMAID and
LUTCAM, than to build the organizational and operational capacity of these local NGOs. At the same time
donor and policy attention has focused on strengthening local capacity in Mine Action – to the point where
locally driven, coordinated and executed initiatives now constitute best practice in Mine Action. EC Mine
Action Strategies have emphasized Local Capacity as both a vehicle towards the desired outcomes and an
outcome, in and of itself.
23
UNDP’s decision to create a second clearance organization entirely dependent on the CAAMI and
UNDP instead of building on or co-opting what already existed, i.e. HUMAID, does not appear, in
retrospect to be very strategic. While there may have been extenuating factors related to personalities and
local politics that seemed to justify the move at the time, the end result has been inefficiencies in the use of
limited donor resources and external technical assistance.
24
Upon establishing the CAAMI in 2001, it was stated that Guinea-Bissau could be mine-free by 2003.
Later this projection was extended to 2005 for the capital Bissau and 2006 for the country – the projection
used in some measure to justify the EC funded HI initiative aimed at clearing Bissau over the January 2005
to March 2006 timeframe. Current projections are one more year to complete Bissau – to the end of 2006,
depending on EOD capacity and funding, and 3-5 years for the whole country.
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7.

ASSESSING EFFICIENCY & EFFECTIVENESS

KEY QUESTIONS
Did HI do the job right while doing the right job?
Did the project reduce the threat of mines and UXO
efficiently and effectively?
Do the clearance outputs justify the project costs?
Did the project strengthen local capacity for Mine Action
efficiently and effectively?
Does HUMAID’s organizational performance justify the project costs?
Is HUMAID more efficient and effective as a result of the partnership with HI?

Did HI do the job right while doing the right job?
Overall HI can be said to have done the job right ---- for the most part, and therefore
fulfilled efficiency objectives. However the assessment of whether HI did the right job is
open to debate. In demining and EOD training HI was widely regarded as having done
the right job --- albeit after considerable delays. In much of the organizational capacitybuilding work HI did a good job but arguably did not do the right job. As noted, HI
recognized early in the project that HUMAID was not fully on track but did not allow
themselves the flexibility to change course. The result was a disproportionate
investment in time, energy and material resources in short-term interventions with
limited results and no sustainability. Thus the project was mostly efficient, but less
effective than it might have been.

Did the project reduce the threat of mines and UXO efficiently and
effectively?
In the case of Bissau, clearing all suspected contamination in the short-term with existing
operational capacity is a viable objective and a national imperative. Prioritizing clearance
is further justified by the nature of the contamination in highly populated urban and periurban areas. Marking and MRE are inadequate. The mines and UXO must be cleared.
Although budget support to HUMAID ensured continued clearance operations through
most of 2005, the project prioritized capacity-building first and foremost. The project did
not pursue efficiency in mine / UXO clearance, per se. Rather, the project set out to
strengthen local capacity as per IMAS. Quality clearance (effectiveness) was
considered more important than production targets (efficiency).
HUMAID’s lower than usual clearance results for 2005 should be assessed in this light.
HI technical assistance and on-the-ground accompaniment of HUMAID’s clearance
operations resulted in greater efficiency in the use of materials and equipment, and in
manual clearance techniques.
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Of note is the fact that HUMAID had a pre-existing operational capacity, infrastructure,
vehicles, basic equipment and materials. The project budget reinforced the equipment
and materials but essentially, built upon and brought value-added to prior investments.
In this context the EC / HI investment in HUMAID’s clearance capacity was a very
efficient and effective use of resources.
Significant delays in EOD training and the postponement of EOD operations limited the
overall efficiency and effectiveness of the project in reducing the UXO threat.
As foot-noted in a previous section of this report, many have argued that given the finite
and short-term nature of the mine / UXO problem in Guinea-Bissau, the objective of
efficiency should outweigh the importance of local operational capacity. And, the
frustrations of capacity-building for local capacity led HI staff to ponder the possibilities
had HI established an operational presence and contracted local deminers instead of
partnering with HUMAID. No doubt, an HI operation would have resulted in greater
efficiencies but at the cost of reducing or eliminating local capacity.

Do the clearance outputs justify the project costs?
As previously noted, HUMAID expended €464,964 in 2005 and cleared a total of 60,140
m2 with a contingent of 38 deminers, 21 additional field personnel, 4 community liaison
staff and 13 administrative staff25.
Dividing the total meters cleared by HUMAID’s direct costs gives a very rough cost
calculation of €7.73 per m2. Calculating in total project costs including HI technical
assistance would substantially increase the cost per m2 cleared. Given HUMAID’s
relatively low productivity in 2005 (as measured in m2) compared to previous years26
and the intensive project investments, it could be concluded from an efficiency
perspective that clearance outputs do not justify project costs.
But, it must be reiterated that capacity-building and effective clearance as per IMAS took
precedence over productivity measured in meters cleared.

Did the project strengthen local capacity for Mine Action efficiently and
effectively?
Other than HI personnel costs, which are relatively low for expatriate technical advisors,
the project budget incorporated few material investments in organizational and technical
capacity-building. In this respect the project worked toward strengthening local capacity
in Mine Action in a low-cost and efficient manner.
In reality HI substantially subsidized its own operational costs. For example, the
decision to maintain a separate office in Bissau, however modest, rather than having the
HI technical advisors work out of HUMAID’s office. Even so, costs remained relatively
low. The main investment was in personnel.

25
26

Final reporting on expenditures may vary slightly from the figures quoted in this report.
Refer to ANNEX E (a and b) for HUMAID’s Cumulative Results 2000-2005.
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The organizational capacity-building strategies implemented by HI varied in their
effectiveness. Administrative, financial and logistical accompaniment served project
management purposes but did not result in greater ownership by HUMAID in improving
systems and procedures. Periodic workshops with HI on organizational development
themes were not well-received by HUMAID’s leadership and did not seem to contribute
to broader objectives. Bringing in external resource people for intensive special
workshops was positively evaluated but the time away from “productive work” resented.
Overall HI approached capacity-building with HUMAID as a training event (the workshop
model) rather than a process of working together (the on-the-job accompaniment
model). This proved to be a less effective approach with HUMAID. There was limited
synergy, too much down-time between ‘events’ (as HI waited for HUMAID to finish
assignments), and lost opportunities to move forward together.
The tensions around methodology were less pronounced with technical training in
demining and EOD but language and literacy challenges would seem to point to on-thejob training being the more effective strategy for training than workshops and formal
classroom learning.
Including LUTCAM deminers and CAAMI Quality Control staff in EOD training was an
efficient approach.

Does HUMAID’s organizational performance justify the project costs?
Is HUMAID more efficient and effective as a result of the partnership with
HI?
(Addditional observations on HUMAID’s organizational performance can be found in
ANNEX F – HUMAID Organizational Assessment.)
HUMAID’s pre-existing organizational capacity justified the HI partnership and EC
funding. HUMAID was worth investing in. The degree to which HUMAID’s
organizational performance improved through the life of the project thereby justifying
project costs is open to interpretation. HI has documented HUMAID’s numerous
organizational achievements in 2005 in administration, finance, human resources and
logistics, and HI’s support role. In clearance activities HUMAID deminers stated that
HUMAID is much more efficient now due to HI’s training and technical accompaniment.
The field staff of HUMAID is well-versed in IMAS and practice has improved. In this
respect, clearance is now more effective. In technical work and in internal operations,
HUMAID has shown improved organizational performance. But do these improvements
justify the investments a) on their own merits? and b) if HUMAID does not survive
beyond the project?
Organizational capacity-building is a medium-term process not easily force-fit into shortterm projects. In the short-term, one could argue that HUMAID’s effectiveness should
be measured in relation to political clout and the ability to secure on-going funding for
operations. From this perspective, HUMAID has not noticeably progressed during the
project.
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8.

ASSESSING SUSTAINABILITY & IMPACT

The sustainability and impact of the project will depend on whether HUMAID continues to
work, which is largely dependent on funding. As the project approaches its end-date,
HUMAID has not secured on-going funding and there does not appear to be a survival
strategy in place. HI has not engaged proactively with HUMAID on this issue (for
example, by assisting HUMAID with program development, public relations, politicking,
developing and marketing its fundraising strategy beyond 2005). Moreover HI’s position
on HUMAID’s future is unclear.
The lack of clarity on the nature of HUMAID’s role in Mine Action vis-à-vis the CAAMI
and LUTCAM and within the CAAMI’s strategic vision is a glaring strategic challenge. HI
has not worked with HUMAID to build its profile as an independent NGO and partner of
the CAAMI (as one strategy), nor does there appear to have been open discussions with
HUMAID about possible mergers with LUTCAM or other scenarios to somehow bring
HUMAID’s clearance capacity into the CAAMI-fold (as another strategy). Given
comments from the Director of the CAAMI that HUMAID will “probably have to fold”, and
behind the scenes strategizing by UNDP regarding possibly “contracting” HUMAID
deminers to maintain operations, the urgency of addressing HUMAID’s organizational
future is evident.
If HUMAID as an independent Mine Action NGO continues, the impact of the EC / HI
investments in capacity-building will be significant and measurable. If HUMAID deminers
trained by HI continue to work in demining and EOD operations in any organizational
structure or configuration, the impact will be measurable but less significant. And, in this
scenario, much of the EC / HI investment in capacity-building will have been for naught.
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9.

CONCLUSIONS

Project Implementation & Contractual Obligations



The project was executed and managed by HI in accordance with EC contractual
obligations. The original financial and programmatic commitments were fulfilled with
few exceptions and all changes were formally communicated to the EC.



The project budget was insufficient to cover all costs necessary to fulfill
programmatic obligations.



Project implementation would have been difficult without the third full-time technical
advisor added to the HI staff team in Bissau.

Project Relevance



The project was well-conceived in line with international Mine Action policy &
practice and the evolving national Mine Action strategies and operational priorities.



The project built on pre-existing local capacities and the organizational strengths of
both the lead international partner – HI, and the local partner, HUMAID.



The decision to partner with HUMAID was strategic - though not without its inherent
challenges, both at the partnership level and in positioning HUMAID (and the HI and
EC investments in Mine Action) for medium-term sustainability and impact.



By funding HUMAID’s clearance operations and providing the necessary training
and technical accompaniment to ensure adherence to IMAS, the project reduced the
threat of mines and UXOs to the civilian population in the urban and peri-urban
areas of Bissau.



HI provided relevant technical training and supports to HUMAID in demining, EOD,
community liaison, MRE and survey techniques.



The technical training and organizational supports in administration, finance,
logistics, and human resources served project management purposes but were less
critical for HUMAID. Other kinds of organizational supports would have been more
relevant. The focus on administrative systems rather than setting the stage for the
continuity of HUMAID’s work stands out as a major short-coming of HI.



The project was an important investment in Guinea-Bissau’s Completion Initiative,
and brought additional human and material resources to the benefit of national
priorities.



The project contributed indirectly to peace-building and national reconciliation
through its constructive engagement with war veterans from both sides of recent
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conflicts, reducing the threat to civilian populations from mines and UXOs, and
securing enhanced livelihoods for war veteran deminers.

Partnership & Capacity-Building



The partnership between HI and HUMAID was a good idea but was complicated by
organizational cultures, personalities, ways of working, and communication styles.



HI and HUMAID lacked a shared vision for HUMAID’s future, and this was manifest
in differences in priorities.



HUMAID wanted funds to carry out clearance operations. HI wanted HUMAID to
follow IMAS, re-structure and professionalize administrative systems. What
HUMAID most needed was to develop strategic leadership, develop programming,
produce marketing materials, and engage strategically with the CAAMI, UNDP,
donors and others to build profile, ‘political’ support and a funding base.



Significant language and literacy challenges were successfully managed by HI.



Technical capacity-building in demining and EOD was evaluated by HUMAID, the
CAAMI and other external observers as successful.

Efficiency & Effectiveness



Given its pre-existing organizational coherence and operational capacity, funding
HUMAID to carry out clearance activities was an efficient and effective use of EC
and HI resources to reduce the threat of mines and UXO in Bissau.

HUMAID



“HUMAID emerged at the right moment, with a high level of legitimacy and
credibility in the community, and rode the wave of Mine Action without ever having
to perform at a high level. On this wave, HUMAID was able to establish an
infrastructural base and secure operational funding with relatively high salaries. Now
that the Mine Action wave has subsided and HUMAID is left swimming around a
very small and very crowded pool with the plug pulled out, funding won’t come so
easily. In this new context, HUMAID must have a clear vision, market a service
and itself,, demonstrate a high level of professionalism and technical capacity, forge
strategic alliances, and get political”.27

Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau



The survival of HUMAID is good for Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau.



In the coming period HUMAID’s survival is intrinsically linked to national Mine Action
priorities and strategies established by the CAAMI with UNDP support.

27

The Evaluators concluding comments in the HUMAID Organizational Assessment – ANNEX F.
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In not proactively engaging in national policy and program development with the
CAAMI and UNDP over the years and most notably over the recent project period,
HUMAID has lost an opportunity to influence strategic directions and secure its
future in Mine Action. HI bears some responsibility for this situation.



The National Plan for Completion 2005-2009 will require HUMAID’s clearance
capacity or its equivalent over the medium-term. Support for HUMAID makes more
sense than any existing alternatives.



HUMAID’s survival will determine whether the EC / HI investments will result in
sustainable local capacity-building toward completion objectives or will be relegated
in history as a short-lived one-off contribution to humanitarian demining.
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10. LESSONS-LEARNED
Local Capacity-Building in Mine Action



Mine Action is political. Funding for Mine Action is competitive. It is not enough to
quietly go about one’s work. Strategic engagement in national coordination
structures, and with key donors and advisors to Mine Action is essential for national
NGOs to secure a place in Mine Action.



Investments in local capacity should correspond to Mine Action objectives and
strategies over the medium-term, or seek to influence these objectives and
strategies in a proactive manner.



Building clearance capacity separate from an organizational sustainability and
funding strategy is not very strategic. Why build capacity if it will never be used?



Highly developed organizational models may not be necessary for successful Mine
Action. In Guinea-Bissau, both HUMAID and LUTCAM began operations with limited
organizational capacity. In the early days, HUMAID had very little organizational
capacity with impressive clearance results. Today LUTCAM has no independent
organizational capacity and yet still manages clearance operations (with UNDP
support).

.

Capacity-Building through Partnership



Both organizational partners should share the same vision of organizational
development.



It is important to not get caught up in bureaucratic details and risk losing sight of the
broader goals.



Partnership is an imperfect relationship. Informal and regular communications are
essential to build consensus on strategies, priorities, methodologies and
mechanisms for mutual accountability.



Written documentation is not enough. It is important to take the time to solicit
feedback and talk through decisions.



Methodologies should be adapted to the organizational culture. The experience
with HUMAID demonstrates that more fluid, in-house, on-the-job accompaniment is
more effective than periodic training workshops and the “textbook” approach.
Accompaniment as a process rather than an event has proven to be more effective
in most cases.



On-the-job mentoring and accompaniment is the best way to develop leadership
skills.
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Normally 1-year capacity-building projects should be avoided. When this is
unavoidable, project objectives should be realistic and strategic.



Unless an organization can pay salaries and operational costs, nothing else will be
important. Training and organizational development within a context of
organizational uncertainty and funding insecurity is always challenging.



Projects should build on what already exists and avoid superimposing new
structures and processes. New structures and processes should be created only
when they are absolutely necessary. The objective should be to minimize
bureaucracy without jeopardizing accountability.



Training schedules should be flexible and oriented to partner needs. Staff involved
in managing operations should not be expected to train full-time without back-up
management strategies in place.



The control and monitoring function in project management should be separate from
the accompaniment and technical assistance functions. i.e. these tasks should be in
two different job descriptions so as to avoid incompatible power dynamics in day-today accompaniment.
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11.

RECOMMENDATIONS
11.1 Recommendations to HI

Project Closure



HI should facilitate a process with HUMAID to produce Standing Operating
Procedures in line with IMAS. If time does not permit a finished product, HI should
at least set out a process and provide guidance to HUMAID as to how to approach
the task independently.



HI should support HUMAID in securing CAAMI accreditation for HUMAID.



HI should produce a written assessment of EOD capacity post-training with specific
recommendations to HUMAID, LUTCAM and the CAAMI as to the establishment of
EOD teams and on-going national EOD capacity. In recommending individuals for
EOD assignments, HI should advise HUMAID as to the short-term repercussions for
manual demining capacity (assuming the “best and brightest” will be deemed most
appropriate for EOD) and suggest strategies to alleviate any short-term reduction in
demining capacity.



HI should document its expert opinion as to the external technical training and
accompaniment required to finish EOD tasks in the city of Bissau. The expert
assessment of HI should be a pre-requisite for any future investment in EOD.



Given the likelihood of an impact survey in Guinea-Bissau in the near future, HI
should coordinate with HUMAID to ensure the CAAMI is fully aware of HUMAID’s
current and potential capacity to contribute to such an initiative.



HI should work with the HUMAID leadership to document HUMAID’s involvement in
MRE and current organizational capacities so as to facilitate HUMAID linking into
national program development in MRE through the CAAMI and related fundraising.



HI should orient the Community Liaison Team of HUMAID, in coordination with
HUMAID’s leadership and the CAAMI, to ensure all contaminated areas in Bissau
are adequately marked, with particular attention to the Paiol given its proximity to
HUMAID’s Annex and the extent of the UXO contamination. The rationale for this
would be 1) as a risk-reduction priority, 2) because HUMAID appears to have a
good stock of marking posts piled up in their Annex, and 3) to increase visibility of
the remaining contamination in Bissau and HUMAID’s presence on-the-ground.
Securing funding in a climate of scarce resources and competing operators usually
has political and politicking dimensions and HUMAID would be well-served by any
measures which increase its visibility and utility.



As a final visibility initiative, HI should work closely with the HUMAID leadership to
organize a PR campaign in Guinea-Bissau targeting the Government, UN, donors,
embassies, private sector and the media. Ideally, HUMAID should have an updated
brochure outlining accomplishments and some sort of “Info Pack” including photos,
and the cost break-down for different types of interventions. At the very least, it
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should be possible for HUMAID to produce an updated Info Sheet and organize a
demonstration demolition aimed to increase visibility and position HUMAID to
fundraise. HI’s strategic and technical accompaniment in these efforts would be
crucial.



HI should format and package HUMAID’s organizational Assessment so that it can
be used by HUMAID externally to leverage funding.



HI should provide whatever support is required to ensure HUMAID deals with the
personnel contracts for 2006 and any outstanding liabilities from 2005. Though it is
entirely HUMAID’s legal responsibility, it would be important to avoid confusao and
negative perceptions which would surely arise with unpaid salaries or indemnities
following an EC / HI project. Perceptions would become distorted….and HI would
carry moral responsibility in the eyes of many.



HI should accompany HUMAID in the process of securing continued personnel
insurance through the end of project.

Future Project Development



HI should explore opportunities to partner with HUMAID or to channel funds to
HUMAID to continue operations.



Any organizational supports to HUMAID should focus on strategic leadership and
program development.



HI should challenge the current thinking within the CAAMI and UNDP which favours
LUTCAM’s organizational survival over HUMAID. In the likely event funding is
insufficient to maintain two clearance organizations, some form of amalgamation
should be explored. Barring this scenario, HI should advocate for HUMAID based
on proven organizational and operational capacity.



HI should seek out funding to provide additional EOD training and supervision to
EOD operations.



HI should pursue participation in an impact or technical survey initiative in GuineaBissau.
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11.2 Recommendations to the EC
Project Closure



The EC Delegation in Guinea-Bissau should encourage the State Secretary for
Veterans Affairs to call a meeting of the National Humanitarian Demining
Commission (CNHD) to review the state of affairs in mine / UXO clearance in
Bissau, to present national priorities, and to lay out the work plan for 2006/07.
Given the EC’s significant investment in Mine Action in 2005/06, it would be an
important opportunity to showcase EC’s contributions while at the same time raising
the profile of Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau with Government, donors, the UN and
media. Increased attention to Mine Action would, in turn, be a first step in finding a
way to “finish the job”, despite limited funds, competing priorities and donor fatigue.



The EC Delegation in Guinea-Bissau should support HI and HUMAID by
participating in a final visibility event to wrap-up the project.

Future Program Development



The EC should explore avenues to fund EOD operations in Guinea-Bissau.
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